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engagements with the news on social media, there has been a rising interest in proactive intervention strategies
to counter the spread of misinformation and its impact on society. In this survey, we describe the modern-day
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the topic of fake news has experienced a resurgence of interest in society. The
increased attention stems largely from growing concerns around the widespread impact of fake
news on public opinion and events. In January 2017, a spokesman for the German government
stated that they “are dealing with a phenomenon of a dimension that [they] have not seen before”,
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referring to the proliferation of fake news on social media.1 Although social media has increased
the ease with which real-time information disseminates, its popularity has exacerbated the problem
of fake news by expediting the speed and scope at which false information can be spread. Fuller
et al. 2009 noted that with the massive growth of online communication, the potential for people to
deceive through computer-mediated communication has also grown and such deception can have
disastrous and far-reaching results on many areas of our lives, including financial markets [14, 53]
and political events [2, 4]. For instance, Carvalho et al. 2011 noted that a false report of bankruptcy
of a United Airlines parent company in 2008 caused the stock price to drop by as much as 76% in a
matter of minutes; although the stock rebounded after the news was identified as false, it closed
11.2% lower than the previous day and the negative effect persisted for six more days. In terms of
political events, an analysis of the US Presidential Election in 2016 by Allcott and Gentzkow 2017
revealed that fake news was widely shared during the three months prior to the election with 30
million total Facebook shares of 115 known pro-Trump fake stories and 7.6 million of 41 known
pro-Clinton fake stories. In addition, false stories often emerge surrounding natural disasters such
as the Japan earthquake in 2011 [110] and Hurricane Sandy in 2012 [37] that are intended to cause
increased panic and disorder; or ones surrounding specific individuals and public figures, such as
the death hoax of Singapore’s first prime minister Lee Kuan Yew [20]. Another severe instance of
the impact of fake news was the infamous “Pizzagate" incident wherein physical violence ensued
as a result of fake stories circulated online [29, 66]. It is clear that the magnitude, diversity, and
substantial dangers of false information in circulation are a genuine cause for concern.
The topic of fake news has not only received tremendous public attention but has also drawn
increasing attention from the academic community. In this regard, there have been attempts to
survey and summarize the literature on fake news detection. In one of the first surveys in the area,
Shu et al. 2017 illustrates an intriguing connection between fake news and social and psychological
theories, which suggest that humans tend to seek, consume and believe information that is aligned
with their ideological beliefs, which often results in the perception and sharing of false information
as true in communities of like-minded people. We note that the past year has witnessed a lot
of new work related to fake news, which extends beyond the works surveyed in [101]. Another
survey by Zubiaga et al. 2018 study a related problem of rumor detection, which differs subtly from
fake news detection in that it seeks to distinguish between verified and unverified information,
wherein the unverified information may turn out to be true or false, or may remain unresolved. The
primary objective of this survey was to provide an architecture for developing a rumor classification
system. In turn, the work summarizes some of the peripheral issues with identifying and tracking
rumors, such as data collection and tools exposed by various social media platforms like Twitter
and Facebook for the same, as well as an extensive list of applications and ongoing research projects
towards this end. The literature surveyed in [132] is specifically restricted to that which is known to
have been applied in the context of rumors. However, rumor classification and fake news detection
are closely related in characteristics and techniques. In this work, we attempt to bridge the gap by
comprehensively summarizing related techniques from closely related contexts. Another survey by
Kumar and Shah 2018 addresses a broader scope of false information on the web. In particular, aside
from fake news on social media, the survey discusses fake reviews on e-commerce platforms and
hoaxes in collaborative platforms such as Wikipedia. The nature and characteristics, and therefore
techniques for detection of fake reviews and Wikipedia hoaxes, differ significantly from fake news
on social media; for instance, fake reviews are opinion-based where there is no single truth value,
information does not propagate over a network, and have specific characteristic such as ratings that
are not applicable to fake news. Although these are extremely important topics in their own right,
1http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/09
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much like the detection of scam email [98], fake followers [23], or false web links [57], we chose to
keep the discussion focused on fake news and provide detailed discussions of the techniques and
their limitations. Moreover, Kumar and Shah 2018 do not discuss some important existing works in
fake news detection [61, 63, 89, 96, 118] and mitigation such as [27, 48, 112] which are important
to understand the advances in this domain. In particular, the purpose of our survey is four fold:
(1) We address both detection and mitigation methods including intervention based techniques,
to allow us to understand the problem in an end-to-end manner and go beyond treating the
problem as a classification task.
(2) We focus on the challenges of developing computational methods to tackle fake news, and
present and compare existing methods that have demonstrated significant progresses in
dealing with those challenges.
(3) Existing surveys lack a comprehensive coverage of available fake news detection datasets.
We consolidate a large comprehensive list of datasets and summarize their characteristic
features – we hope this will aid researchers in selecting the right dataset, will facilitate the
collection of new datasets, and advance development of methods that can unify different
information sources.
(4) Additionally, the rapid advancement of research around fake news necessitates the consoli-
dation of recent works and advances and outlining concrete directions for future research.
Fake news identification and mitigation is a critical and socially relevant problem that is also
technically challenging for a variety of reasons. In the following sections, we first formally define
and characterize fake news and describe the problem and associated challenges. We then present a
comprehensive overview of the existing techniques applicable to detection and mitigation, along
with a discussion of the key limitations and recent advances in various methods. Further, to facilitate
researchers with rigorous evaluation and comparison, we compile a list of existing/available datasets
around fake news detection, and summarize their characteristic features. To conclude, we enumerate
a list of challenges and open problems that outline promising directions for future research.
2 DEFINITION, NATURE, ASSOCIATED CHALLENGES, KEY PLAYERS
In this section, we start by defining fake news and describing the nature and characteristics of the
problem, as well as the key players involved, and the roles they play in information dissemination,
moderation, and consumption. Further, we discuss the main challenges associated with fake news
identification and mitigation, and outline the necessary goals of any system that aims to address
these challenges in an end-to-end, complete, and practically effective manner.
2.1 Definition
The usage and meaning of the term fake news has evolved over time. A Google Trends Analysis of
the term reveals a sudden burst in popularity around the time of the 2016 US presidential election.2
Although originally used to reference false and often sensational information disseminated under
the guise of news reporting3, the term has evolved and become synonymous with the spread of false
information [22]. Fake news has generally been defined as “a news article that is intentionally and
verifiably false" [2, 101] or “information presented as a news story that is factually incorrect and
designed to deceive the consumer into believing it is true" [35]. However the existing definitions are
narrow, restricted either by the type of information or the intent of deception, and do not capture
the broader scope of the term based on its current usage. Therefore, we define fake news as follows,
2https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=2013-12-06%202018-01-06&geo=US&q=fake%20news
3as defined in the Collins English Dictionary
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Definition 2.1. A news article or message published and propagated through media, carrying
false information regardless the means and motives behind it.
This definition allows us to capture the different types of fake news identified in [119] which
can be differentiated by the means employed to falsify information, such as fabricated content
(completely false), misleading content (misleading use of information to frame an issue), imposter
content (genuine sources impersonated with false sources), manipulated content (genuine informa-
tion or imagery manipulated to deceive), false connection (headlines, visuals or captions that do not
support the content), and false context (genuine content shared with false contextual information).
The definition also allows us to include different types of fake news identified by their motive or
intent, such as malicious intent (to hurt or disrepute), profit (for financial gain by increasing views),
influence (to manipulate public opinion), sow discord (to create disorder and confusion), passion
(to promote ideological biases), amusement (individual entertainment) [126]. We can also subdivide
false information by intent as misinformation and disinformation. Misinformation refers to uninten-
tionally spread false information which can be a result of misrepresentation or misunderstanding
stemming from cognitive biases or lack of understanding or attention; and disinformation refers to
false information created and spread specifically with the intention to deceive [54]. Another type of
information that might be closely connected to fake news is satire - satire presents stories as news
that might be factually incorrect, but the intent is not to deceive but rather to call out, ridicule, or
expose behavior that is shameful, corrupt, or otherwise “bad" [35]. The intent behind satire seems
legitimate enough to exclude it from the definition, however, [119] does include satire as a type of
fake news when there is no intention to cause harm but it has potential to mislead or fool people.
Also, [35] mentions that there is a spectrum from fake to satirical news which they found to be
exploited by many fake news sites, which used disclaimers at the bottom of their webpages to
suggest they were “satirical" even when there was nothing satirical about their articles; to protect
them from accusations about being fake. Thereby, our definition must include articles that are
falsely posed as satire, as well as satirical articles that can potentially mislead, and exclude others
that do not fall in this area. Additionally, we disambiguate the terms hoax and rumor which are
closely related to fake news. A hoax is considered to be a false story used to masquerade the truth,
and, by the traditional definition, fake news can be seen as a form of hoax usually spread through
news outlets [132]. The term rumor refers to unsubstantiated claims that are disseminated with
the lack of evidence to support them. This makes them very similar to fake news, with the main
difference being that they are not necessarily false, and may turn out to be true [132]. Rumors
originate from unverified sources but may later be verified as true or false, or remain unresolved.
Thereby, our definition can be seen as naturally encompassing hoaxes and false rumors.
2.2 Nature/Characteristics
The definition of fake news is not the only thing that has changed with time. With the growth
of computer-mediated communication through social media, we can see that the nature and
characteristics of the problem have also evolved. Hence, we start by reviewing the literature
from sociology and psychologically that explain the existence and spread of fake news at both an
individual and social level.
2.2.1 Individual level. The inability of an individual to accurately discern fake from true news leads
to the continued sharing and believing of false information in social media. YouGov 2017 found in a
survey of 1684 British adults who were shown six individual news stories, three of which were true
and three of which were fake, only 4 percent were able to identify them all correctly. The inability
to discern has been attributed to cognitive abilities and ideological biases. Pennycook and Rand
2018 identified a positive correlation between propensity for analytical thinking and the ability to
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discern false from true information. In addition, Allcott and Gentzkow 2017 observed that people
who spend more time consuming media, people with higher education, and older people had more
accurate perceptions of information. The results were statistically significant in a survey of 1208 US
adults. Another study examined the impact of cognitive ability on the durability of opinions to find
that individuals with lower cognitive ability adjusted their assessments after being told that the
information given was incorrect, but not nearly to the same extent as those with higher cognitive
ability [93]. Besides cognitive abilities, ideological priors play an important role in information
consumption. Naive realism (individuals tend to more easily believe information that is aligned
with their views), confirmation bias (individuals seek out and prefer to receive information that
confirms their existing views), and normative influence theory (individuals choose to share and
consume socially safe options as a preference for social acceptance and affirmation) are generally
regarded as important factors in the perception and sharing of fake news [101]. The survey by
Allcott and Gentzkow 2017 also found with statistical significance that people (Democrats and
Republicans) are respectively, 17.2 and 14.7 percent more likely to believe ideologically aligned
articles than they are to believe nonaligned articles, although the differences in magnitude across
the two groups (Democrats and Republicans) are not statistically significant. These individual
vulnerabilities have been exploited to successfully disseminate fake information. Higgins 2016
declared this era as an era of “post-truth" wherein objective facts are less influential in shaping
public opinion than appeals to emotions and personal beliefs4.
2.2.2 Social level. The nature of social media and collaborative information sharing on online
platforms provides an additional dimension to fake news, popularly called the echo chamber effect
[101]. The principles of naive realism, confirmation bias and normative influence theory discussed
above in Section 2.2.1 essentially imply the need for individuals to seek, consume and share infor-
mation that is aligned with their own views and ideologies. As a consequence, individuals tend to
form connections with ideologically similar individuals (social homophily), and algorithms tend to
personalize recommendations (algorithmic personalization) by recommending content that suits an
individual’s preferences, as well as by recommending connections to similar individuals to befriend
or follow. Both social homophily and algorithmic personalization lead to the formation of echo
chambers and filter bubbles, wherein individuals get less exposure to conflicting viewpoints and
become isolated in their own information bubble [33]. The existence of echo chambers can improve
the chances of survival and spread of fake news which can be explained by the phenomena of social
credibility and frequency heuristic, where social credibility suggests that people’s perception of
credibility of a piece of information increases if others also perceive it as credible; and frequency
heuristic refers to the increase in people’s perception of credibility with multiple exposures to the
same information [101]. Gillani et al. 2018 examined a network of 1.1M Twitter users who partici-
pated in conversations about the US 2016 presidential election between June-September 2016 and
observed the existence of echo chambers and polarization of views based on the political orientation
(democratic and republic) as visualized in Figure 1 that shows the follower relationships (edges)
between users marked by the color of their political orientation (which is inferred from a user’s
profile and tweet contents as per [114]). Quattrociocchi et al. 2016 similarly studied polarization by
scientific v/s conspiracy narratives in Facebook users and observed that although both types of
information were consumed similarly overall, 76.79% of all users who interacted on scientific pages
and 91.53% of all users who interacted with conspiracy posts had 95% of their likes on either science
or conspiracy posts. In addition, polarized users had a higher number of friends who displayed the
same behaviour; and higher edge homogeneity, measuring the similarity between friends in the
network, suggested that it is highly unlikely that information would propagate across the different
4as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, 2016
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Fig. 1. Nodes represent a sample of about 900 Twitter accounts that participated in the conversation about
the US Presidential Election between June and mid-September 2016, and edges represent mutual-follower
relationships between these accounts. Nodes are sized according to relative PageRank importance in the
depicted network, and colored according to inferred political ideology (red: right-leaning, blue: left-leaning,
white: unsure) [34]. Data source: [34].
groups.
Fake news diffusion patterns on social media have often been studied to identify the characteristics
of fake news that can help differentiate it from true news. Fake news detection works essentially
rely on exploiting these differences to classify information based on its veracity. Most existing
works primarily target the classification as a binary classification task (fake/true, rumor/non-rumor,
hoax/non-hoax) or as a multi-class classification task (true/mostly true/half true/mostly false/false,
unverified rumor/true rumor/false rumor/non-rumor). The main difference in different task set-
tings is due to different annotation schemes or applications contexts in different datasets. Usually
the datasets are collected from annotated claims on fact-checking websites such as PolitiFact,
Snopes and others and therefore reflect the labeling scheme used by the particular fact-checking
website/organization. In some instances, credibility scores are provided based on human annotator
judgments instead of class labels. A detailed description of different datasets and their annota-
tions is provided in Table 2 when we summarize and discuss existing datasets in Section 7. In the
remainder of this section, we examine different characteristics of fake news that are utilized for
detection. We can identify three primary characteristics relevant for fake news detection, namely
the source/promoters of the information, the information content, and the user responses it receives
on social media.
(1) Source/promoters. Zimdars 2016 maintains a list of web addresses of fake news websites;
several of which are modified names of true news websites, such as “abcnews.com.co" and
“washingtonsblog.com". The use of such misleading domain names are a particular charac-
teristic of fake news sources which individuals must learn to recognize and be attentive
about. However, there are two caveats to filtering information based solely on these lists.
One is that not all articles from these sources are fake and the other is that the list can
never be exhaustive. In particular, the use of online resources and social media make it very
easy, convenient and inexpensive to create bots and register new accounts or domains [54].
Bots are fake or compromised accounts controlled by humans or programs to introduce and
promote information on social media. Subrahmanian et al. 2016 found a significant overlap
between follower and followees of bot accounts that spread false information, which helps
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Fig. 2. The heatmap of the day of week vs hour of tweets posted related to fake news (left) and real news
(right). Darker colors indicate greater posting activity in a particular time slot [100]. Data source: [100].
to engineer virality and credibility of posts and inflate the social status of the bot accounts.
Davis et al. 2016 found that on Twitter large number of bot accounts were responsible for
accelerating the speed of both true and false information roughly equally. Shu et al. 2018
randomly sampled 10,000 users who posted fake and real news on Twitter and used the bot
detection algorithm by [24] to find that almost 22% of users involved in fake news are bots,
while only around 9% of users are predicted as bot users for real news. They also investigated
the temporal patterns of account activities by capturing the relationship between number of
posts on Twitter at different times and days of the week for posts related to fake and true
news; and observed that periods of high posting activity included odd hours when people
are generally inactive, suggesting the existence of social bots [100]. The temporal patterns
observed by Shu et al. 2018 are shown in Figure 2. Lastly, analyzing how source and promoters
of fake news operate over the web across multiple online platforms, Zannettou et al. 2018
found that false information is more likely to spread across platforms (18% appearing on
multiple platforms) compared to true information (11%), with Reddit to Twitter to 4chan
being the most common direction of information flow.
(2) Information content. The content of the information being spread is primarily what needs
to be classified as true or fake. Horne and Adali 2017 identified certain characteristics that
differentiate fake news contents from true news contents by studying the textual character-
istics of articles from various fake news websites and contrasting them with articles from
reputed journalistic websites. Their findings suggest that titles of fake news articles are
longer, have more capitalized words, and use fewer stop words; and the body content of fake
news articles are shorter, repetitive, have fewer nouns, and analytical and technical words.
Pérez-Rosas et al. 2017 found that fake news articles contained more social words, with more
verbs and temporal words suggesting that the text tends to be focused on the present and
future, instead of being more objective and factual. Other textual cues include self-reference,
negation statements, complaints, and generalizing items [116]. Newman et al. 2003 analysis
revealed that deceptive stories had lower cognitive complexity, fewer exclusive words, more
negative emotion words, and more motion (action) words. Silverman 2015 observed that 13%
of 1600 news articles had incoherent headlines and content, and used declarative headlines
paired with article bodies which are skeptical about the claim in the headline [54].
(3) User responses. User responses on social media provide auxiliary information that is ex-
tremely beneficial for fake news detection. They are known to provide stronger signals for
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detection than the information content, mainly because user responses and propagation
patterns are harder to manipulate than the information content, and oftentimes contain
obvious information about the veracity [100]. This secondary information in the form of
user engagements (likes, shares, replies or comments) contains rich information captured
in the propagation structure (tree) which indicates the path of information flow, temporal
information in timestamps of engagements, textual information in user comments, and user
profile information by the user involved in the engagement. Zubiaga et al. 2018 note that
it is possible to differentiate user responses by their stance, wherein the most commonly
used categorization uses the following four types, namely, supporting, denying, querying
and commenting (which can be neutral or unrelated). They also observe that the nature of
user responses varies depending on the stages of propagation, where, in the case of rumors,
it was observed that majority of the users support true rumors and a higher number deny
false rumors when the entire life cycle of the rumor was considered; whereas by studying
only the early reactions to rumors, it was found that users showed a tendency to support
rumors independent of their veracity, which is suggestive of the fact that users have problems
determining veracity in the early stages. Qian et al. 2018 similarly found that fake news
tends to receive more negative and questioning responses than true news. Another analysis
of true and fake news captured the variation of sentiments in user replies, wherein it was
observed that sentiment in replies to true news tended more towards neutral, in contrast to
that for fake news that tended more towards negative sentiments [100]. Friggeri et al. 2014
also found from an analysis of user responses on Facebook, that user responses change once
false information is debunked, with a 4.4 times increase in deletion probability, even in early
stages of the propagation.
2.3 Information Exchange Process
There are several different entities (individuals and organizations) that are simultaneously at play
when it comes to the dissemination, moderation and consumption of fake news through social
media, which makes the problem of identification and mitigation more complex and involved. We
discuss each part of the information exchange process.
2.3.1 Dissemination. A noticeable shift in information dissemination channels from traditional
forms of journalism to online social media has been observed [78, 83]. In a survey of 3,000 journalists,
20%, responded that they thought that social media spelled the death of journalism [78]. Social
media sites have become the popular form of dissemination due to growing ease of access and
popularity of computer-mediated communication. Fake news can have a larger impact through
social media due to the large scale and reach of social media; and the ability to collaboratively share
content [40].
2.3.2 Moderation. While in traditional forms of journalism the responsibility of content creation
rests with the journalist and the reporting organization, moderation in social media varies substan-
tially. In 2017, Germany passed the NetzDG (Network Enforcement) Act5 to enforce removal of fake
news within 24 hours (or up to a week depending on the complexity) by social media platforms with
more than two million users. In UK, the parliament launched an investigation into how fake news
is threatening modern democracy [38]. Nevertheless, the question of distribution of responsibility
remains unresolved. A recent survey by Barthel et al. 2016 determined that Americans collectively
assign a fairly high and equal amount (45%) of responsibility to the government/politicians, social
5https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42510868
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media platforms/search engines, and lastly, members of the public; and specifically 15% hold all
three responsible, while 27% hold two and 31% hold one of three responsible. [5].
2.3.3 Consumption. Information is primarily consumed by the general public or society which is a
growing body of social media users. In a 2018 survey on social media usage with 2002 US adults
surveyed, [104] established that 68% Americans use of Facebook, 73% use Youtube and between
20-40% use other social media platforms such as Twitter and Instagram, and the numbers have
grown almost ten-fold since 2005 [83]. Smith and Anderson 2018 also established that 74% of the
Facebook users use the site daily, with 51% using it several times a day; and a large fraction of
frequent users lie in the 18-29 range. This growth in information consumption through social media
adds to the risks of fake news causing wide-spread damage.
2.4 Key Players
We now consider a more subtle aspect that usually characterizes fake news, that is, the intent to
deceive. In this light, we discuss the different roles that entities (individuals and organizations) play
when it comes to dealing with fake news.
2.4.1 Adversary. Malicious individuals and organizations with a political or social agenda often
pose as ordinary social media users using social bots [6] or actual accounts and can act as the source
as well as promoters of fake news. Such accounts are known to also indulge in group behavior
wherein groups of such accounts coordinate and share the same set of fake news articles [96]. The
general characteristics of sources and promoters of fake news have been discussed in Section 2.2.
2.4.2 Fact-checker. In an attempt to combat the growing amount of false information, various
fact-checking organizations, such as Snopes and Politifact, have been initiated to expose or
confirm news stories. While these organizations are based on “fact-checking journalism", that relies
on human verification, more desirable automated technological solutions have been proposed by
technological companies like Factmata which aim to provide fake news detection solutions to
businesses and consumers and assign credibility scores to web content using artificial intelligence.
Various other automated solutions in the form of plug-ins and applications such as BS-Detector and
CrossCheck provide similar automated fact-checking services. An exhaustive list of fact-checking
applications is provided in [132].
2.4.3 Susceptible. Fake news affects a wide range of individuals and organizations based on the
motive. We summarized different motives or intents behind the spread of fake news in Section 2.1.
For instance, reputable institutions and individuals might be susceptible to the attacks of fake news
that is intended to sway public opinion about them, such as what was witnessed during the US
2016 presidential election [2]. Other consequences can even prove to be an increased risk to the
entire world. Roozenbeek and van der Linden 2018 noted that false information discrediting the
seriousness of global warming can affect people’s perception of climate change, posing a great risk
to society and the world at large.
2.5 Challenges
The nature of the problem presents several challenges, which we summarize as follows.
2.5.1 High stakes and multiple players. The World Economic Forum (2013) has ranked the spread
of false information as one of the “top risks" the world is facing today. Moreover, the involvement
of multiple entities and technological platforms increases the difficulty of studying and designing
computational, technological and business strategies, without compromising rapid and collaborative
access to high quality information.
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2.5.2 Adversarial intent. Malicious intent in content design and promotion increases the complexity
of the problem. The content is designed to not only make it harder for humans to identify fake
news by exploiting their cognitive abilities, emotions and ideological biases as discussed in Section
2.2.1, but also to make it more challenging for computational methods to detect fake news. Shu
et al. 2018 evaluated the performance of several different methods on two datasets from PolitiFact
and GossipCop and reported a maximum detection accuracy of 69% and 79.6% respectively, even
when using both article contents and social context i.e. user responses to the article on Twitter.
2.5.3 Public susceptibility and lack of awareness. To raise public awareness, numerous articles and
blogs have been written that provide tips on differentiating truth from falsehood. For example,
award-wining journalist Laura McClure highlighted five important questions to ask yourself when
trying to determine whether a news article is true or fake. In one of the questions, McClure asked
the reader to consider how an article makes them feel, citing that fake news is often “designed
to make you feel strong emotions”.6 Articles such as McClure’s are informative and effective for
individuals; however, they do not provide a scalable and systematic solution to the problem.
2.5.4 Propagation dynamics. The dynamic nature of the process of fake news propagation through
social media further complicates matters. False information can easily reach and impact a large
number of users in short time [31, 89]. Friggeri et al. 2014 studied rumor cascades on Facebook
and found that information is readily and rapidly transmitted, even when it is of dubious veracity.
Fact-checking organizations like Snopes and Politifact cannot keep up with the propagation
dynamics as they require human verification which inhibits a timely and cost-effective response
[48, 96].
2.5.5 Constant change. Fast-paced developments in the world pose additional challenges to knowl-
edge base systems which need to dynamically retrieve and update their state based on newly
emerging facts [87]. Fact-checking is ultimately essential for reliably identifying fake news. For
example, while scandals are not uncommon among celebrities, when a new scandal about a celebrity
comes out, without enough extra knowledge, it is very difficult to tell whether it is fake or not.
Potthast et al. 2017 note that style-based fake news detection i.e. differentiating fake and true news
by an analysis of writing styles are simply alternatives used due to the unresolved challenges in
automating fact-checking from knowledge bases.
2.6 Requirements/Goals
Existing works have demonstrated significant progresses towards alleviating some of the challenges
in fake news detection and mitigation. However, there is still room for improvement before the
problem can be addressed in more effective ways. We suggest few requirements that are of interest
in developing solutions to tackle fake news.
2.6.1 Balancing aggressive and non-aggressive moderation. Identification and mitigation techniques
that require very aggressivemoderation by social media platforms can hurt the social media platform
[27]. Thereby, it seems necessary to design strategies that still effectively mitigate the problem
of fake news, but without restricting rapid access to high quality information, and collaborative
information sharing. We believe that it is also important that the moderation strategies do not
further introduce more confusion and distrust into the environment. Fake news has already resulted
in people becoming skeptical of even true information, which hurts the value of social media as a
platform for information sharing. A survey of 1002 Us adults [5] found that (64%) people say that
6http://blog.ed.ted.com/2017/01/12/how-to-tell-fake-news-from-real-news/
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fake news has caused a great deal of confusion about the basic facts of current issues and events,
24% say it has caused some confusion and 11% say not much/no confusion.
2.6.2 End-to-end solutions. Reliable and timely detection of fake news should be accompanied by
computational methods to intervene and prevent further spread of news that is confirmed as fake.
In addition, it would be desirable to design interventions that can provide quantifiable measures of
the impact of the intervention effort in terms of the exposures to fake and true news [27].
2.6.3 Balancing timeliness v/s detection accuracy. Early detection and mitigation are critical goals of
any effective system. However, the available information for detection increases as time progresses,
with only the content of the article being available at the start, followed by increasing user responses
as propagation continues [89]. Most existing methods either rely on content only or on user
responses only, or do not utilize responses incrementally. Detection systems must aim to utilize
incrementally available information to trade-off confidence in detection accuracy v/s timeliness of
the detection and mitigation effort.
2.6.4 Prioritization and cost-effectiveness. The ability to optimally decide which contents to fact-
check at what time, can equip the system in providing better responses by being able to quickly
remove false information that can have a potentially larger and faster impact than those that
might have a negligible or slower impact if allowed to propagate further in time [48, 79]. Also,
human involvement in fact-checking increases not only the delay but also the cost of intervention,
which necessitates the need for prioritization of information to manually fact-check, until reliable
automated methods can be sought [79].
2.6.5 Robustness, scalability and interpretability. The high stakes and consequences of fake news
necessitates the need for reliability in detection. Mistakenly removing true information from
the platform, or not detecting and removing potentially viral false information would become
problematic in practice. To move from manual and semi-automated solutions to fully automated
ones will not be possible without robust and also interpretable predictions. Popat et al. 2018
emphasized transparency and interpretability in credibility assessment systems and built CredEye
which verifies an input claim and provides the probability of truth and falsehood along with
extracted evidence (from fact-checking or trusted news websites) with words that support the claim
highlighted in green, refuting the claim highlighted in red and words overlapping with the claim
provided in yellow, and the intensity of colors reflects the word’s importance for the assessment
(based on feature weights from the learned classifier).
2.6.6 Evolution and up-to-date fact-checking. The adversarial nature of fake news necessitates that
the system should be able to dynamically adapt to the changing strategies of adversarial opponents.
Specifically, adversaries create new accounts and throw-away accounts to promote fake news and
avoid detection [54], as can be seen in an instance of the US election when potentially large number
of fake accounts were created to influence the election and were found to initiate coordinated attacks
with specific political agendas7. In addition, increased sophistication in adversarial techniques are
speculated in terms of both fake content creation [54], as well as in strategies to promote fake
content. Ruchansky et al. 2017 observed from behaviours of suspicious users on Twitter, that these
users had more similar engagement patterns towards true and fake news than on Weibo, which
could demonstrate an increased sophistication in fake content promotion on Twitter.
7https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-election.html
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Table 1. Categorization of existing methods
Content-Based Identification Feedback-Based Identification Intervention-Based Solutions
Cue and feature methods Hand-crafted features Mitigation strategies
Linguistic analysis methods Propagation pattern analysis Identification strategies
Deep learning content-based Temporal pattern analysis
Response text analysis
Response user analysis
3 OVERVIEW OF METHODS
We divide the existing work into three types. The first type is fake news identification using
content-based methods, that classify news based on the content of the information to be verified.
The second type is identification using feedback-based methods, that classify news based on the
user responses it receives on social media. Lastly, the third type is intervention based solutions,
that provide computational solutions for actively identifying and containing the spread of false
information, and methods to mitigate the impact from exposures to false information. Each category
is further divided based on the type of existing methods, as shown in Table 1.
4 CONTENT-BASED IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we give an overview of content based approaches to fake news detection. The
underlying basis of content based detection is that textual content in fake news differs from that
in true news in some quantifiable way. The use of language cues to determine veracity was first
motivated by work in applied psychology for evaluation of eyewitness testimonies [113]. Language
cues can be exploited with traditional hand-engineered feature based methods, linguistics based
methods, and more advanced deep learning methods that bypass feature engineering for content
analysis.
4.1 Cue and feature based methods
Cue and feature based methods can be employed to distinguish fake news contents from true news
contents by designing a set of linguistic cues that are informative of the content veracity. Several
different cue sets have been proposed in literature.
4.1.1 Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN). One of the earliest works on examining the use of
linguistic cues for fake news detection was by Driscoll 1994, that studied transcripts or written
statements made by individuals in a criminal investigation. In order to determine the credibility of
the information given by suspects in such statements, they utilized an approach called Scientific
Content Analysis (SCAN), which was proposed by the polygraph examiner Sapir 1987, based
on his experience with subjects of polygraph examinations. SCAN consists of cues related to
deception detection. The cues include content and structural criteria such as lack of connection
between paragraphs, lack of conviction or memory, denial of allegations, missing and out of
order information, use of emotive words, objective or subjective words, pronouns, first person,
singular, and past tense verbs. While the examination by Driscoll 1994 revealed positive results in
differentiating true from false statements using SCAN, later works have found them to be ineffective
based on more rigorous evaluations, finding no significant differences between true and fabricated
statements concerning these criteria [9, 72].
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Limitation. Although intuitive, SCAN is set of subjective criteria lacking enough supporting
evidence; and moreover, the approach requires the use of trained professionals to analyze the
statements for veracity, making it difficult to automate.
4.1.2 Linguistic-Based Cue Set (LBC). In an attempt to reduce human involvement in deception
detection, one of the pioneering automated text analysis methods was by Fuller et al. 2009. Fuller
et al. 2009 consolidated several linguistic-based cues and previously proposed cue sets. The first
cue set included was the Zhou/Burgoon set [130] comprising 14 linguistic based cues that were
found effective for deception detection included percentage of first person singular and plural
pronouns in the text, average word length, verb quantity, sensory ratio, spatial and temporal
ratio, and imagery. The second set of cues was derived from deception constructs drawn from
deception theories [12, 13] that included sentence and word quantity, activation, certainty terms,
generalizing terms, imagery, and verb quantity. The third cue set was a comprehensive set of 31
cues created by including the first two cue sets along with additional Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count (LIWC) [80] based cues utilized by previous studies [10, 74], and included lexical diversity,
modal verbs, passive verbs, emotiveness, exclusive terms, and redundancy. The final cue set was a
refined cue set determined by feature selection to identify the most important of the 31 cues in the
comprehensive set. To determine the relative importance of cues, Fuller et al. 2009 utilized three
different classifiers, that is neural network, decision tree, and logistic regression, on statements of
witnesses in official investigations; wherein the input feature vector to the classifier consisted of
the normalized frequency of cues appearing in the text. The eight cues obtained through feature
selection were third person pronouns, content word diversity, exclusive terms, lexical diversity,
modifiers, sentence quantity, verb quantity and word quantity.
Limitation. The drawback of using linguistic-based cue sets is the lack of generalizability across
topics, languages and domains. Ali and Levine 2008 showed that a linguistic cue set designed for
one situation may not be suitable for another situation due to language variations e.g. a cue set
designed for accounting [58] or police interrogation [86] may differ significantly.
4.1.3 Other variants. Later works have explored refined hand-crafted cue sets more closely targeted
towards the problem of fake news detection. Rubin et al. 2016 analyzed several text analysis based
features, such as the number of punctuation marks and the sentiment of the text. Zhao et al. 2015
proposed different regular expressions to capture enquiry and correction patterns in posts on social
media, which are indicative of rumors such as “is (that/this/it) true" which capture enquiry and
“(that/this/it) is not true" which capture correction. They also included some platform specific
features such as counts of ‘hashtags’, and ‘mentions’ in posts on Twitter, as well as the ratio of
enquiry or correcting posts in a cluster of posts having high textual similarity i.e. posts discussing
similar content. Others works that have proposed cue sets designed specifically for certain types
of social media platforms include [15, 36, 69] for Twitter, [55] for Wikipedia, [17] for click-bait
websites.
Limitation. Exhaustive enumeration of regular expression patterns is non-trivial and requires
significant effort. Furthermore, identifying relevant platform specific features for a large variety of
social media platforms is also challenging and reduces applicability of the method across platforms
and domains.
Limitations of cue and feature based methods. To summarize the limitations, variations in
linguistic cues implies that a new cue set must be designed for a new situation, making it hard to
generalize cue and feature engineering methods across topics and domains. And such approaches
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thereby involve more human involvement in the process to design, evaluate and utilize these cues
for detection.
4.2 Linguistic analysis based methods
While manual cue selection is intuitive and interpretable, it is often specific to the setting being
considered and does not generalize easily to other settings. In an attempt to make cue-based
models more general, methods based on linguistic analysis were proposed. Linguistic analysis based
methods, like cue-based methods, can be applied to distinguish fake from true news by exploiting
differences in writing style, language and sentiment. Such methods do not require task-specific,
hand-engineered cue sets and rely on automatically extracting linguistic features from the text. We
discuss three linguistic analysis based methods that are applied to fake news detection.
4.2.1 N-gram Approach. The most effective linguistic analysis method applied to fake news detec-
tion is the n-gram approach [67, 76, 77]. n-grams are sequences of n contiguous words in a text,
constituting words (unigrams) and phrases (bigrams, trigrams) and are widely used in language
modeling and text analysis.
Approach. Mihalcea and Strapparava 2009 proposed the use of n-grams for lie detection. They
constructed datasets using crowd-sourcing which constituted statements of people lying about
their beliefs on topics such as abortion and death penalty / lying about their feelings on friendship.
Mihalcea and Strapparava 2009 wanted to determine how the texts differed and whether n-grams
analysis was enough to differentiate lies from the truth. They trained Naive Bayes and Support
Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers with inputs being the term frequency vectors of n-grams in the
texts, after tokenization and stemming but without stop word removal. Interestingly enough the
classification accuracy was about 70% in identifying people’s lies about their beliefs, and 75% in
identifying lies about their feelings. A fine-grained analysis of word usage revealed that in all the
deceptive texts, connections to the self (“I, friends, self") were lacking and other human-related word
classes (“you, other, humans") were dominant, indicative of the speaker’s discomfort in identifying
themselves with the lying statements. Also, it was found that words related to “certainty" were
dominant in deceptive texts, which is probably explained by the need for the speaker to explicitly
use truth-related words as a means to make their false statements more believable. [76, 77] provided
similar n-gram classification analysis for deceptive reviews created by crowd-sourced workers
on Amazon Mechanical Turk, who were asked to create fake positive reviews about hotels [77]
and fake negative reviews about hotels [76]. Their analysis revealed that fake reviews contained
less spatial words (location, floor, small), because the individual had not actually experienced the
hotel and had less spatial detail available for the review. They also found that positive sentiment
words were exaggerated in positive fake reviews compared to their true counterparts. A similar
exaggeration was seen in negative sentiment words in fake negative reviews.
Limitation. Being a simplified approach, using n-grams alone cannot entirely capture finer-
grained linguistic information present in the writing styles of fake news.
4.2.2 Part-of-Speech Tags. Apart from word based features such as n-grams, syntactic features
such as Part-of-Speech (POS) tags are also exploited to capture linguistic characteristics of texts.
POS tags are obtained by tagging each word in a sentence according to its syntactic function,
such as nouns, pronouns, adjectives; and several works have found the frequency distribution
of POS tags to be closely linked to the genre of the text being considered, for example, medical
consultations, committee meetings, and sermons, each have their own distinctive pattern [7, 92].
Ott et al. 2011 examined whether this variation in POS tag distribution also exists with respect to
text veracity. They trained a SVM classifier using relative POS tag frequencies of texts as features
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on a dataset containing fake reviews. Ott et al. 2011 obtained better classification performance
with the n-grams approach, but nevertheless found that the POS tag approach is a strong baseline
outperforming the best human judge. A qualitative analysis showed that the weights learned by
the classifier are largely in agreement with the findings of existing theories on deceptive writing
such as [92] which suggests connections of deceptive opinions to imaginative writing comprising
more verbs, adverbs, pronouns and pre-determiners, and truthful opinions to informative writing
comprising more nouns, adjectives, prepositions, determiners and coordinating conjunctions.
Limitation. The sole use of POS tags provides syntactic information alone and is weaker thanword
based approaches that capture more information, inclusive of writing styles such as emotiveness
inferred from words like excited, terrible, etc.
4.2.3 Probabilistic Context Free Grammar. Later work has considered deeper syntactic features
derived from Probabilistic Context Free Grammars (PCFG) trees [45]. Context Free Grammar (CFG)
tree represents the grammatical structure of a sentence with the terminal nodes representing
words and intermediate nodes representing syntactic constituents such as verb, noun phrase,
etc. Depending on language construction ambiguities, a sentence can have multiple syntactic
representations. PCFG enables disambiguation by associating a probability with each tree, where
the probability of a tree is the product of the probabilities of all production rules in the tree. A
production rule is represented as follows, A→ α where A ∈ V and α ∈ (V ∪T )∗; V being the set
of intermediate nodes and T being the set of terminal nodes. The production rule probability is
statistically derived from the corpus.
Approach. Feng et al. 2012 examined the use of PCFG to encode deeper syntactic features for
deception detection. In particular, they proposed four variants when encoding production rules as
features. The first variant includes only those production rules from the data that do not contain
terminal nodes. The second variant includes all production rules derived from the dataset. The
third and fourth variant modifies the production rules to include grandparent nodes (i.e. parent of
node A in rule A→ α ), with and without rules with terminal nodes respectively. The feature vector
is constructed using the tf-idf counts (normalized frequency) of production rules in the text. Feng
et al. 2012 trained an SVM classifier, and found PCFG features used with n-gram features to be more
beneficial than POS tags with n-grams in classifying fake texts from hotel reviews and lie detection
datasets [67, 77]. Feng et al. 2012 noted that of the four variants of production rules, the ones with
the terminal nodes included were more powerful since they contained word based information
in addition to syntax information. A qualitative analysis of the most discriminative syntactic
constituents based on the classifier weights indicated the use of certain syntactic constituents such
as indirect enquiry (WHADVP), verb phrases (VP), and subordinating conjunction clauses (SBAR)
to be more frequent and important in fake texts as compared to true texts.
Limitation. PCFG can be used to extract syntactic features from a sentence but is not powerful
enough to capture context sensitive information from across sentences, thereby limiting its effec-
tiveness in classification of longer fake news articles or texts.
Limitations of linguistic analysis based methods. Even with word based n-gram features
combined with deeper syntactic features from PCFG trees, linguistic analysis methods although
better than cue-based methods, still do not fully extract and exploit the rich semantic and syntactic
information in the content. n-gram approach is simple and cannot model more complex contextual
dependencies in the text. Syntactic features used alone are less powerful than word based n-grams,
and a naive combination of the two cannot capture their complex interdependence.
ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol., Vol. 37, No. 4, Article 111. Publication date: August 2018.
111:16 Sharma, et al.
Fig. 3. CNN architecture used for fake news detection [118]. Data source: [118].
4.3 Deep learning content-based methods
Deep learning methods alleviate the shortcomings of linguistic analysis based methods by automatic
feature extraction, being able to extract both simple features and more complex features that
are difficult to specify. Deep learning based methods have demonstrated significant advances in
text classification and analysis [8, 49, 123] and are powerful methods for feature extraction and
classification with their ability to capture complex patterns relevant to the task.
4.3.1 Convolutional Neural Networks. Convolutional neural networks (CNN) [60] are generally
used in natural language processing tasks such as semantic parsing [123] and text classification [49].
Wang 2017 proposed the use of convolutional neural networks for content-based fake news detection.
Wang 2017 collected a dataset of short statements labeled based on the degree of falsehood by
PolitiFact, a reputed fact-checking organization. Figure 3 shows the model architecture proposed
by [118]. The model takes two inputs, the statement text and the speaker metadata information
such as political orientation, home state, etc. available in the dataset. The text inputs are processed
by a word embedding layer to obtain continuous low dimensional representations for each word in
the text sequence. The output of this layer is processed by convolutional and max-pooling layers
that generate the extracted feature representation. Similarly, the speaker metadata is also processed
similarly by a different embedding and convolutional layer and a bidirectional LSTM [42] layer
to generate its final extracted feature representation. The two representations are concatenated
and fed to the classifier trained end-to-end with the other layers. Wang 2017 utilized pre-trained
word2vec embeddings [68] to warm start the text embeddings. These word embeddings are known
to capture useful properties of word co-occurrences and contextual properties, and semantic
relationships between words, trained on large corpora of unlabeled texts. Wang 2017 observed
better detection accuracy with the deep learning based CNN model compared to using SVM and
logistic regression and also found the inclusion of speaker metadata beneficial. Qian et al. 2018
also similarly demonstrated improved CNN performance over linguistic analysis based methods
such as LIWC, POS and n-gram approach when classifying a collection of news articles as fake or
true. In addition, to handle longer article texts, Qian et al. 2018 suggested a variant of the CNN
architecture called Two-Level Convolutional Neural Network (TCNN) which first takes an average
of word embedding vectors for words in a sentence to generate sentence representations, and then
represents articles as a sequence of sentence representations provided as input to the convolutional
and pooling layers. Qian et al. 2018 found the TCNN variant to be more effective than CNN in
classifying the articles.
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4.3.2 Other Variants. Recurrent neural network (RNN) [97] based architectures are also proposed
for fake news detection. RNNs process the word embeddings in the text sequentially, one word/token
at a time, utilizing at each step the information from the current word to update its hidden state
which has aggregated information about the previous words. The final hidden state is generally
taken as the feature representation extracted by the RNN for the given input sequence. A specific
variant called Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [42], which alleviates some of the training difficul-
ties in RNN, is often used due to the its ability to effectively capture long range dependencies in
the text, and has been applied to fake news detection, similar to the use of convolutional neural
networks, in several works [91, 117]; whereas in another variant, LSTM has been applied to both,
article headline and article text (body), in an attempt to classify the level of disagreement between
the two for deception detection [19].
Limitations of deep learning based methods. Even with sophisticated feature extraction of
deep learning methods, fake news detection remains to be a challenge, primarily because the
content is crafted to resemble the truth in order to deceive readers; and without fact-checking
or additional information, it is often hard to determine veracity by text analysis alone. A recent
evaluation [100] benchmarking different methods on datasets of political statements and celebrity
gossip news also confirms relatively low classification accuracy of 63% and 70% on the two datasets
using purely content-based classification with CNN.
5 FEEDBACK-BASED IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we present and discuss feedback based approaches for fake news detection. In
content based approaches, the text of an article is regarded as the primary source of information.
However, rich secondary information in the form of user responses and comments on articles and
patterns of news propagation through social media, can likely be more informative than article
contents which are crafted to avoid detection. These secondary information sources form the basis
of the works discussed in this section.
5.1 Hand-engineered features
Hand-engineered features proposed for fake news detection from feedback signals include various
types of features such as, propagation pattern features, temporal pattern features, text-related and
user-related features. Castillo et al. 2011 designed a feature set to include user-based features (e.g.
registration age and number of followers), text-based features (e.g. the proportion of tweets that
have a mention ‘@’ ), and propagation based features (e.g. the depth of the re-tweet tree) and used
a decision tree model to classify news as fake using the designed feature vector. Variants of the
above include other network-based features that are slightly extended or tailored to a particular
context, such as the inclusion of temporal features [56], or geographic location and type of device
(mobile or PC) from which the response was sent [122].
Limitation. Feature engineering allows us to incorporate diverse kinds of information, which is
useful in this case. However, hand-engineered features are limited in terms of the generality and
complexity of the feature space being captured.
5.2 Propagation pattern analysis
True and fake news spread through social media in the form of shares and re-shares of the source
and shared posts, resulting in a diffusion cascade or tree, with the source post at the root. The path
of re-shares and other propagation dynamics of fake and true news contents are utilized for fake
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news detection. In this section, we discuss works that specifically utilize propagation structures
and patterns for fake news detection.
5.2.1 Propagation tree kernels. Propagation tree kernel methods exploit the differences in propaga-
tion patterns of two diffusion cascades (trees) as features for detection. Ma et al. 2017 proposed to
compare the similarity between propagation trees using tree kernels that were applied to syntactic
modeling tasks in [21, 70, 127].
Approach. Ma et al. 2017 defined a tree kernel which is utilized to compute the similarity between
two trees as follows. Each node of the tree corresponds to a specific user engagement with the article;
and is associated with the timestamp of the engagement, textual information (user’s comment/reply)
and the user’s metadata. These attributes form the feature set of the node. The similarity between
two nodes (one from each propagation tree) is a function of the similarity between the node features
and similarity over subtrees, computed recursively. Ma et al. 2017 designed the tree kernel with
different measures of similarity for different features. For textual features, they utilized Jaccard
similarity as a measure of similarity over n-grams in the textual information J (ci , c j ). For the
temporal similarity, they considered the absolute difference of the time lags t = |ti − tj |, where the
time lag is basically the relative difference of timestamp of the engagement and the timestamp
of the source post. For user metadata features, they considered the L2-norm (euclidean distance)
between the user metadata feature vectors E(ui ,uj ). Combining the three metrics of similarity, the
similarity between two nodes vi and vj is defined as follows,
f (vi ,vj ) = e−|ti−tj |(αE(ui ,uj ) + (1 − α)J (ci , c j )),
where vi is a node from one propagation tree and vj from the other, α is a constant, ui ,uj are user
metadata vectors, and ci , c j are the textual information n-gram vectors, ti , tj are the time lags of the
engagements. Using the defined kernel, Ma et al. 2017 computed the similarity between every pair
of diffusion cascades in the dataset, and used SVM with the defined tree kernel for classification,
observing improved detection performance over methods that do not utilize propagation patterns.
Wu et al. 2015 similarly defined a random walk graph kernel [46] to calculate similarity between
different propagation trees. The designed kernel function is composed of the random walk graph
kernel over propagation trees and the standard RBF (radial basis function) kernel over other features,
paired with SVM, similar to [63].
Limitation. Propagation tree kernel methods are computationally intensive (requiring the com-
putation of pairwise similarities over all trees), which can prohibit their large scale applicability to
the task of fake news detection.
5.2.2 Propagation tree neural networks. The limitations of propagation tree kernel methods have
been addressed by more recent works [65] using deep learning methods. The advances proposed
in Ma et al. 2018b, not only significantly reduce the computation costs and time, but also manage
to improve over the detection accuracy obtained by the tree kernel methods [63]. Ma et al. 2018b
proposed the use of recursive neural networks, generally used in syntactic and semantic parsing
[105–107] to extract propagation features from diffusion cascades.
Approach. Ma et al. 2018b design two recursive neural network models based on bottom-up
and top-down tree-structured recursive neural networks. Similar to recurrent neural networks
(RNN) mentioned in Section 4.3.2, that sequentially process each timestep (word) in the input
sequence while aggregating information from previous timesteps (words), the recursive tree neural
network sequentially processes each node in the tree by recursively traversing the tree structure
in either the top-down or bottom-up manner based on the design. In the bottom-up approach,
ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol., Vol. 37, No. 4, Article 111. Publication date: August 2018.
Combating Fake News: A Survey on Identification and Mitigation Techniques 111:19
Fig. 4. Tree structured recursive neural network architectures considered in [65]. Data source: [65].
information is aggregated starting from leaf nodes and propagated upwards, such that the final
feature representation obtained at the root is representative of the complete propagation tree, and is
used for classification. The weights in the classification layer (output layer with softmax activation)
and the parameters of the recursive network are trained end-to-end based on the classification loss.
In the top-down approach, information flows over paths in the tree and the resulting representations
at the leaves are combined to generate the extracted feature representation of the tree that is used
by the classification layer. Figure 4 shows the proposed network architectures. Ma et al. 2018b
find that both architectures outperform propagation tree kernels and other baselines that do not
utilize tree structured information in user engagements. They also find that the top-down approach
performs better, which they believe is because it assumes the direction of information flow through
the diffusion cascade.
Limitation. The sequential recursive nature of computations impacts training speed. In addition,
since information will be aggregated and compressed over many nodes, in large cascades it might
potentially not retain enough information from all nodes to obtain a good representation for the
tree.
5.2.3 Propagation process modeling. Alternatively, extensions to models originating from epi-
demiology that model the spread of diseases [50, 73] have also been applied to characterize the
propagation of fake news. Jin et al. 2013 proposed a mathematical model called SEIZ to capture
how people share news on social media. Jin et al. 2013 consider a set of eight news stories spanning
multiple topics such as politics, terrorist events, etc. propagating on Twitter, of which four are true
news, and the rest are rumors, and examine if the proposed model can characterize the studied
cascades.
Approach. The proposed model SEIZ is defined by dividing users into four partitions: susceptible
users (‘S’) that have not heard about the news yet, exposed users (‘E’) who have received the news
and will share it in the future (with some delay), infected users (‘I’) that have shared it, and skeptic
users (‘Z’) that have heard about the news but do not share the news. A user can transition from
one partition to another with a certain probability and at a certain rate, as defined by the model.
The parameters of the model β , ρ,b, ϵ are the rates of transitions between different partitions,
whereas p, l are transition probabilities (for instance, probability of a ‘S’ user moving to ‘Z’ is l
and to ‘E’ is 1 − l , with rate b). It is assumed that each partition has an associated size at time
t , but the total size of all partitions combined remains constant over time (i.e. users only transit
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from one partition to another and the propagation dynamics are controlled by the parameters
of the model). The size of a partition at a given time is obtained by solving a set of differential
equations based on the initial size of partitions and the rate constants and probabilities, which form
the parameters of the model. The parameters are estimated using nonlinear least squares fit on
an observed cascade corresponding to true or fake news. Each step of the fitting process involves
iteratively refining a set of parameter values by numerically solving the system of differential
equations to minimize the difference between observed shares and the size of partition ‘I’ based on
the model |I (t) − observed shares (t)|. Jin et al. 2013 quantify a ratio (Rsi ) as the ratio of influx into
E from S to the outflow from E to I, and suggest that it can potentially be used to detect rumors,
where they found higher RSI is suggestive of true news based on the studied cascades. The ratio is
defined as follows,
RSI =
(1 − pβ) + (1 − l)b
p + ϵ
where p, ρ, β , b, l and ϵ refer to the model parameters mentioned earlier.
Limitation. The model parameters are not user specific and the same rate constants and prob-
abilities are assumed for all users. Moreover, the model has not been specifically tested for fake
news detection to validate its empirical success or computational feasibility.
5.3 Temporal pattern analysis
Differences in temporal dynamics of user engagements with articles can be leveraged for fake news
detection. The length of time and the rate and intervals at which true and fake news spreads can
differ. Extracting intricate interactions and variations along time explicitly is the focus of the work
presented in this section.
5.3.1 Temporal variation features. Temporal modeling methods are applied to sequentially ordered
responsesTi = {t1, t2 · · · tn}, in which each post ti has a time stamp at which the interaction or user
engagement with the article is recorded. In the simplest form, temporal features can be incorporated
by taking both, features in each time interval and the variation between features of two temporally
adjacent intervals [62]. In particular, Ma et al. 2015 consider three types of features, that is, text
features (such as percentage of posts with exclamation or question marks, percentage of posts with
hashtags or user mentions, average number of positive/negative emoticons), user features (such
as percentage of verified users, average number of followers, registration age) and propagation
features (such as average number of reshares, average number of comments). Ma et al. 2015 divide
every sequence of ordered posts into a fixed number of time intervals and each post in the sequence
falls within some interval. Based on that, they compute the features for each time interval from
aggregation of posts up to that interval. In addition, the variation of features between two adjoining
time intervals is considered as the differences in the feature values divided by the interval length.
The final feature vector is a concatenation of features from each interval together with the temporal
variation features, which is paired with an SVM classifier in [62]. Ma et al. 2015 observe reasonable
performance improvements over methods that do not consider temporal patterns and rely only on
the overall statistics such as total number of reshares, or time length of propagation, and ignore
their variations over time.
Limitation. One shortcoming of such a primitive feature variation model is that it requires hand-
crafted features which are further restricted to numerical features over which temporal variations
can be considered.
5.3.2 Temporal pattern with recurrent neural networks. Intricate temporal variation differences
between true and fake news can be automatically extracted with deep learning based methods.
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Recurrent neural networks (RNN) are effective in time series modeling. The approach used in
general for application to fake news detection is to divide the sequentially ordered engagements
into discrete time intervals. Each interval is represented by a set of features. The ordered sequence
of feature vectors is provided as input to the recurrent neural network. Each timestep is processed
by the network by building on information processed in previous timesteps.
Approach. Ruchansky et al. 2017 partition a given sequence of engagements using discrete time
intervals at specific granularity. Timestamps of engagements are considered relative to the first
engagement in the sequence. Each interval is represented by the aggregated features of engagements
in that interval. Specifically, the feature vector has the following form, where η is the number of
engagements in interval t , △t is the time between the current and previous non-empty interval,
xu is the average of user-features over users that engaged with the article during t , and xτ is the
textual content in engagements during t :
xt = (η,△t ,xu ,xτ )
Together, η and △t provide a general measure of the frequency and distribution of the response an
article received. The textual features xτ can be generated in different ways. Ruchansky et al. 2017
in particular, chose to learn xτ from the raw text features using the doc2vec [59] model. Ruchansky
et al. 2017 trained an LSTM recurrent neural network [42] with the sequence of feature vectors xt
as input for classification of fake news based on the user engagements. They used two datasets,
one with engagements on Twitter, and the other on Weibo. Both datasets did not contain article
contents and the classification is done solely using the user responses (engagements) available in
the dataset, using the proposed LSTM model. The datasets also does not contain any propagation
tree information and therefore, the engagements of a given article can only be ordered temporally.
The model architecture proposed by Ruchansky et al. 2017 also contains a second component. The
first component we discussed here is to capture the temporal and textual patterns in user responses.
The second component is to separately capture user characteristics and group behaviours and
is explained in 5.5.2. Another earlier work by Ma et al. 2016 also examined the use of recurrent
neural networks to capture temporal patterns from engagements. The architecture by Ma et al. 2016
does not include the second component capturing user characteristics. The feature representation
chosen in the two works differs slightly, in that Ma et al. 2016 uses tf-idf vectors as text features,
and temporal differences are not provided as features as in Ruchansky et al. 2017, but are instead
captured by sampling engagements at regular intervals from the time series. The slight differences
in feature representations chosen by the two do not affect model performance. Ma et al. 2016
also examined the performance of other RNN variants besides LSTM, such as Gated Recurrent
Unit (GRU) [18], and a two layered GRU network, and found the latter to have slightly better
performance out of all three variants.
Limitation. Cascades with too many user responses, would possibly require some sampling
or pruning scheme to be efficiently represented, which may result in distortion of the temporal
patterns.
5.4 Response text analysis
The text in user responses can be quite informative towards fake news detection. Even without
access to the article content, response text can provide at least some insights about the article
content. It is also likely that fake or dubious articles will receive more negative and questioning
responses which can be leveraged for detection. In this section, we discuss methods that specifically
exploit textual content in user responses.
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Fig. 5. Attention weights learned over different words in the sentences. Darker color is indicative of greater
attention, making the corresponding words more relevant to the fake news detection task [16]. Data source:
[16].
5.4.1 Deep attention. Work discussed in Section 5.3.2 utilized tf-idf features and doc2vec word
embeddings to represent textual response features. Another variant of that work proposed by
Chen et al. 2017 focuses specifically on the extracted textual information by adding an attention
mechanism into the LSTM architecture to capture representative words of fake news and are able
to depict which portions of the text can be indicative of truth and deceit; an example is shown
in Figure 5, wherein words marked in darker red color appeared to be more important for the
fake news detection task, and vice versa. Although adding attention was not found to specifically
improve detection performance, it provides some interpretability in the extracted features.
Limitation. The deep attention used is nice for providing insights into interpretability but is
not seen to improve detection accuracy in Chen et al. 2017, thereby is more useful for qualitative
studies on fake news rather than detection.
5.4.2 User response generation. Fake news detection research is generally split between content
based and feedback based identification, i.e. detection using either article text or using secondary
information from user engagements with the article. Qian et al. 2018 provides a new approach to
integrate the two sources of information directly targeted towards early fake news detection. User
responses to articles can only be available after the news has propagated sufficiently in order to
collect enough number of user responses to apply detection methods. This can lead to increasing
costs and is averse to the timeliness of detection. The article text on the other hand is available
from the beginning. The early detection setting considered by Qian et al. 2018 assumes that only
the article text is available at the time of detection, which is similar to detection using content
based methods.
Approach. Unlike content based methods, Qian et al. 2018 propose a new strategy based on
probabilistic generative modeling to still leverage rich secondary information without having
access to responses for the article being classified. The strategy is to instead utilize historically
collected articles and associated user responses to learn a probability distribution over user responses
conditioned on the article, which can then be used to generate sampled responses to the article
being classified. The conditional generative model (i.e. user response generator URG) is shown in
Figure 6. Article features are extracted using a convolutional neural network (CNN) trained on
article word features. The obtained article representation along with the user response words are
used to then train the URG. During detection, the article representation is first extracted using
the CNN and used to condition the URG to generate sample responses to the article by sampling
from the learned distribution. At this time, the URG receives only the article representation as an
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Fig. 6. Top 20 words from the generated response samples to a fake news article (left) and the user response
generator network (right) [89]. Data source: [89].
Fig. 7. Neural multi-task learning for stance detection and veracity classification jointly [64]. Data source:
[64].
input since there are no user responses collected at the time of detection, and relies on the learned
distribution to generate sample responses. The final classification is done using the concatenated
features of the extracted article representation from the CNN and the generated samples of user
responses obtained from the URG conditioned on the article representation. The approach is found
to have improved detection performance over using only the extracted article representation for
detection.
Limitation. Qian et al. 2018 only utilize a simplistic bag-of-words representation (vector of term
frequency of words) of the textual features of the user response, that are provided as input to
the URG (generative model). Such representations might not capture more intricate syntactic and
semantic information available in the word sequences of texts.
5.4.3 Stance detection. User responses (comments) have also been utilized to improve detection
performance by explicitly taking into account their stance towards the content being discussed.
It is generally considered that each user response has one of four stances, namely, support, deny,
query or comment. Recent works have considered multi-task learning approaches to jointly provide
stance detection and veracity classification in order to improve classification accuracy by utilizing
the interdependence in the two tasks [51, 64]. Both these works proposed multi-task learning
architectures based on recurrent neural networks with shared and task specific parameters.
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Approach. Ma et al. 2018a combine the tasks of stance detection and veracity classification where
each task is assigned a shared GRU layer and a task-specific GRU layer. The purpose of the shared
GRU layer is to capture patterns common to both tasks, whereas task specific GRU enables the
capture of patterns that are more important to one task than to the other. For instance, veracity
classification relies more strongly on patterns directly conveying veracity such as “true" and “false",
whereas patterns like “believe", “don’t think" can be more directed towards stance detection. The
architecture proposed by Ma et al. 2018a is depicted in Figure 7. The input is a sequence of posts
(user responses) represented by text (tf-idf) features. The input sequence of vectors are converted
to low dimensional representations using a shared embedding layer and task-specific embedding
layers and provided as input sequences to the respective shared and task-specific GRU layers. To
enhance the interaction between the task-specific layer and shared layer, the hidden state at each
time step of the task-specific GRUs are additionally made dependent on the hidden state from the
shared GRU layer as shown in Figure 7. In the veracity classification task, the hidden state at the
last time step of the task-specific GRU is utilized for classification using a fully-connected output
layer with softmax activation specific to the veracity classification task. In the stance detection
task, every post in the sequence is classified using a fully-connected output layer with softmax
activation specific to the stance detection task. Ma et al. 2018a found that joint learning of stance
detection and veracity classification tasks improves the performance of individual tasks. Utilizing
shared and task-specific parameters were observed to be more beneficial than using only the shared
parameters without the task-specific layer. Kochkina et al. 2018a proposed a similar approach
with shared and task-specific LSTM layers for rumor detection, stance classification and rumor
veracity classification jointly (rumor detection was specified as classifying the sequence of posts
as responses to a rumor or non-rumor; and the rumor veracity classification task was specified
as classifying the rumors as true, false or remains unverified). In addition, each input sequence
is considered as a sequence of posts along a particular branch of the propagation tree, instead of
considering all posts by their temporal ordering regardless of the propagation tree as in Ma et al.
2018a.
Limitation. The process of annotating the stance of each user response, which is required as
training data can be crowd-sourced but is still a time intensive process.
5.5 Response user analysis
User reputation has long been a considered factor in many Internet services such as Amazon,
LinkedIn, TripAdvisor, and other e-commerce applications8, and on content sharing platforms like
Wikipedia, StackOverflow, Quora. In the case of fake news propagation, users can be involved as
sources or promoters of misinformation. In this section, we discuss efforts made towards character-
ization of users posting and propagating news over social media.
5.5.1 User features. User features can be obtained based on two types of information. One is the
features extracted from user profiles on social networks. The second is features extracted based on
user behaviors from content sharing and response patterns of the user. For the first type of features,
hand-crafted user features like registration age of users, number of followers, and the like, are
leveraged in Castillo et al. 2011 along with other textual and propagation features for fake news
detection. Another way of obtaining user representations is proposed by Wu and Liu 2018 who
construct user representations using network embedding approaches on the social network graph.
For the second type of features, Tacchini et al. 2017 construct a feature vector consisting of the
set of users who liked (responded) to the source article or post, and used these feature vectors to
8http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/11/07/suing.ebay.idg/
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Fig. 8. Temporal pattern analysis and user group behavior analysis [96]. Data source: [96].
train a logistic regression model for classification of the source article or post as fake. The model
essentially tries to capture patterns in user behaviors across articles for classification. Similarly,
Qazvinian et al. 2011 compute probability distributions over users involved in fake and true posts
from collected user engagements in order to model user behavior patterns.
Limitation. Hand engineered user features can be restrictive to one social media platform and
not generalize to others. Individual user profile and behaviour should be complemented by analysis
of user group behaviours.
5.5.2 User group analysis. Most previous work treat individual user information separately, without
considering group behaviors of users. Ruchansky et al. 2017 noted that there are groups of users
who share the same set of fake articles. According to the analytical study of information sharing on
social media [25], “users tend to aggregate in communities of interest”, and “users mostly tend to
select and share content according to a specific narrative and to ignore the rest.” Group behaviors
of users are therefore beneficial for generalization of features across users and in identifying
anomalous user groups responsible for the promotion of fake news.
Approach. To detect group behaviours, Ruchansky et al. 2017 constructed a weighted user-user
graph where an edge between users denotes the number of articles that both have co-engaged
with. The user feature vector is constructed using singular value decomposition on the user-user
graph i.e. the user co-engagements matrix. The user features constructed this way are lower
dimensional distributed representation of users reflective of user group engagements and behaviors.
The architecture of the detection model is shown in Figure 8. The capture component is used
to extract temporal information from user engagements as explained in Section 5.3.2. The score
component is used to learn a learn a suspiciousness score for each user and takes user feature
vectors as input. It is observed that the method is able to generate meaningful suspiciousness
scores over users, which are positively correlated with the engagements of the users in true and
fake article cascades. In addition, the detection performance is observed to improve due to the
integration the score component capturing user group behaviors, into the overall architecture.
Additionally, the benefit of the above method is that the user feature extraction does not require
labeled cascades and we can extract user features from co-engagement information derived from
unlabeled cascades itself. Labeled cascades are expensive to obtain.
Limitation. The main limitation is that in cases where new fake accounts and social bots are cre-
ated specifically to spread fake news, there might be no collected user behaviors for such accounts
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and no direct way to generalize extracted user features to these accounts.
Limitations of existing feedback based methods. One significant drawback of existing feed-
back based classification methods discussed above is that the models are trained on a snapshot of
the user responses generally collected after or towards the end of the propagation process, when
sufficient responses are available. This explains a drop in performance on early detection using the
trained models when fewer responses are available. The methods do not have the ability to update
their state based on incrementally available user responses.
6 INTERVENTION-BASED SOLUTIONS
The scope of the methods discussed in content based and feedback based identification is limited to
classifying news from a snapshot of features extracted from social media. For practical applications,
we need techniques that can dynamically interpret and update the choice of actions for combating
fake news based on real time content propagation dynamics. We discuss the works that provide
such computational methods and algorithms in this section.
6.1 Mitigation strategies
Exposure to fake news can lead to a massive shift in public opinion as noted in Section 1. We
discuss several strategies aimed at reversing this effect by strategically introducing true news into
the social media platforms such that users can be exposed to the truth and the impacts of fake
news on user opinion can be mitigated. Computational methods designed for this purpose, require
us to first consider some of the widely used information diffusion models. There are several well
known models used to represent information diffusion in social networks, such as the Independent
Cascade (IC) and Linear Threshold (LT) model [47] and point process models such as Hawkes Process
model [129]. The IC model represents each edge with a parameter pu,v denoting the strength of
influence of user u on user v . The diffusion process starts with a set of seed nodes assumed to
be activated at the first timestep. At each time step of the diffusion process, a node u activated
at time step t , independently makes a single activation attempt on each inactive neighbor v . The
activation succeeds with probability pu,v and a node once activated remains activated throughout
the diffusion process. In the LT model the edge parameters represent a weight of influence and
additionally each user has a separate (uniformly and independently) random threshold parameter
and the sum of weights of incoming edges should be less than one. Accordingly, activation of a
user occurs if the weights of all its activated neighbors exceed its threshold at a given timestep of
the diffusion process. Point process models are defined differently from the above two, by defining
an intensity function which we discuss later in Section 6.1.3.
6.1.1 Decontamination. Nguyen et al. 2012 proposed a strategy to decontaminate users that have
been exposed to fake news. The diffusion process is modeled using the Independent Cascade or
Linear Threshold model [47] described earlier. A greedy algorithm is designed to select the best set
of seed users from which to start the diffusion process for true news, so that at least a β-fraction
of the users can be decontaminated. The algorithm is a simple greedy algorithm that iteratively
selects the next best user to include into the seed set based on the marginal gains obtained by the
inclusion of the user (i.e. the number of users that will be activated or reached by the true news in
expectation, if the seed set did additionally include the chosen user). The iterative selection of seed
users is continued till the objective of decontaminating β-fraction of the contaminated users in
expectation can be achieved. Nguyen et al. 2012 show that this greedy algorithm has a (1 − 1/e)
approximation ratio with respect to the optimal seed set that should be selected.
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Limitation. One drawback of the proposed approach is that it is suggested as a corrective measure
after the spread of fake news. Secondly, the number of seeds is not fixed, and if the damage done is
large the cost of correction by activating or incentivizing more seed users to start the true news
cascade might be prohibitive.
6.1.2 Competing cascades. Several other works propose a more interesting intervention strategy
based on competing cascades; wherein a true news cascade is introduced to compete with the fake
news cascade as the fake news originates and begins to propagate through the network, rather
than after its propagation. In particular, Budak et al. 2011 and He et al. 2012 formulated an influence
blocking maximization objective, as finding an optimal strategy to disseminate true news in the
presence of a misinformation cascade by strategically selecting k seed users, with the objective of
minimizing the number of users who at the end of the diffusion are activated by the fake news
campaign instead of the true news one. The model assumes that a user once activated by either the
fake or true cascade, remains activated under that cascade. Each edge contains a separate set of
diffusion model parameters one for true news and the other for fake. It is reasonable to model the
two types of diffusion processes separately, as the strength of influence under true news might not
be the same when sharing fake news. Budak et al. 2011 showed that a similar greedy algorithm
as discussed in Section 6.1.1 achieves a (1 − 1/e) approximation ratio to the optimal under the
restriction that the true news influence probabilities are all 1 or exactly equal to the negative
influence probabilities. He et al. 2012 similarly showed that under the Linear Threshold model, the
greedy algorithm ratio is (1 − 1/e) without requiring restrictions on the influence weights.
Limitation. The selection of seed users for the true news cascade happens once at the beginning
of the process in response to a detected fake news cascade, after which both cascades continue to
propagate competitively without external moderation. Secondly, a user being “activated" represents
both exposure and re-sharing, since the model does not differentiate between them and assumes
that an activated user is exposed and always attempts to activate its neighbors through forced
re-sharing.
6.1.3 Multi-stage intervention. Extension to a multi-stage intervention strategy was proposed
by Farajtabar et al. 2017 to allow external interventions to adapt as necessary to the observed
propagation dynamics of fake news. Specifically, Farajtabar et al. 2017 considered a different model
of social influence based on multivariate point processes wherein past news sharing events trigger
future news sharing events based on the intensities of influence and time delay between events.
Approach. In multivariate point processes, each user i’s (news sharing) events are triggered by
their base intensity µi and past (news sharing) events with some decay function д that depends on
the time gap between the current time and the past event, and the past events of other users j , whose
influence is captured by αi, j . The intensity function of user i is then λi (t) = µi +∑tj<t αi, jд(t − tj )
and the probability of an event conditioned on past events is proportional to the intensity function.
[27] find that this model can naturally capture the diffusion of fake (true) news and allow one to
separately capture being ‘exposed’ to fake (true) news v/s being exposed and ‘sharing’ fake (true)
news, addressing the drawbacks of works mentioned in 6.1.2 which cannot make that distinction
and assume that if a user is exposed to fake (true) news, the user also shares the fake (true) news
with his/her social media connections. Farajtabar et al. 2017 model fake news with one point process
F (t) and its counteracting true (mitigation) news with another M(t).M(t) represents a vector with
the number of times each user shares a mitigation event.M(t) = BM(t) where B is the adjacency
matrix represent event exposures, implying that a user is exposed whenever she or her neighbor
shares the news. Similarly, fake news event shares and exposures counts are represented with F (t)
and F (t). The purpose of the intervention at any stage is to externally incentivize certain users
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(social network moderators can recommend, display or share the true event with them directly)
in order to enable increased sharing of true news over the network that can counteract the fake
news process. At each stage of the intervention certain budget and user activity constraints are
imposed. The model allows us to solve for the optimal amount of external incentivization needed
on every user at each stage under imposed constraints which will be enough to achieve a desired
objective/reward from the intervention (such as minimizing the difference between fake and true
news exposures). Farajtabar et al. 2017 provide a reinforcement learning based policy iteration
framework for optimization of the proposed multi-stage intervention objective to derive the optimal
amount of external incentivization.
Limitation. The method assumes that one has already identified fake news and is tracking its
propagation through the network, that is not trivial. Moreover, it could be arguable that once we
have identified the fake news, we should simply use direct recommendations of true news to the
users who we know are exposed to the fake news; and remove the fake news content from the
platform to prevent future spread.
6.2 Identification strategies
As stated earlier in Section 1, studies on information cascades reveal that information is readily and
rapidly transmitted over the network, even when it is of dubious veracity [31]. Given that even fake
news can propagate exponentially quickly through reshares on social media, intervention efforts
directed towards early identification and containment of fake news are of primary significance.
In this section, we discuss works that suggest different mechanisms and intervention efforts to
actively detect and prevent the spread of fake news on social media.
6.2.1 Network monitoring. Intervention strategy based on network monitoring involves intercept-
ing information from a list of suspected sources of fake news using computer-aided social media
accounts or real paid user accounts, whose role is to filter the information they receive and block
what they consider to be fake news. The network monitor placement can be determined by finding
the cut or partition of the network which has the highest probability of transmission across the
cut, and a maximum of k users on the side of suspected sources [3]. Another possible network
monitoring placement solution is based on a Stackelberg game between attacker and defender
nodes [125]. The solution to the game allows the network administrator to select the set of nodes
to monitor. Multiple monitoring sites with heterogeneous detection capabilities in both works are
motivated by two ideas. One that having multiple check-points where fake news can be detected
reduces the chance that the fake news would go undetected. Secondly, having multiple human
or machine classifiers improves detection robustness, because something that is missed by one
fact-checker might be captured by another.
Limitation. In changing network topologies, network monitoring solutions would require to
update their strategy based on the change. Also, network monitoring on large-scale networks could
be expensive due to the size of the network.
6.2.2 Crowd-sourcing. Another set of intervention efforts are designed to leverage crowd-sourcing
mechanisms introduced on social media platforms which allow users to report or flag fake news
articles. Instead of explicit network monitors as used by the approaches discussed earlier, these
works implicitly monitor the network using crowd-sourced user feedback. However, a major
drawback of the reporting or flagging mechanism is its possible misuse by adversaries. In addition,
even signals from trustworthy users can be noisy since users are not all equally good at identifying
misinformation. A data-driven assessment by Freeman 2017 on data from LinkedIn, suggests that
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only 1.3 % of the users show measurable and repeatable skills at reporting actions performed by
fake accounts.
Approach. One way to leverage crowd-sourced signals to prioritize fact-checking of news articles
was proposed in Kim et al. 2018 by capturing the trade-off between the collection of evidence
(flags) v/s the harm caused from more users being exposed to fake news (exposures) to determine
when the news needs to be verified. They modeled the fact-checking process and events using
point process models and derived the optimal intensity of fact-checking which is proportional
to the rate of exposures to misinformation and the collected evidence as flags. In order to more
accurately leverage user flags, Tschiatschek et al. 2017 designed an online learning algorithm to
jointly infer the flagging accuracies of users whilst identifying fake news. The algorithm selects k
news to inspect at each stage by greedily picking the ones that maximize the total expected utility -
The total expected utility is an aggregation of the expected utility (reward) over each stage t of the
intervention, starting from stage 1, up to the last stage T (that the algorithm is allowed to fix), and
is mathematically defined as follows.
Util(T ,ALGO) =
T∑
t=1
E
[∑
s ∈S t
1{y⋆(s)=f }valt (s)
]
,
where valt (s) is the expected reward at stage t from the inspection and debunked of fake news from
the news selected for fact-checking at stage t . The reward at stage t can be modeled as the number
of users prevented from seeing the fake news because of the intervention and debunking at stage
t . Tschiatschek et al. 2017 note that this quantity can be estimated by modeling and simulating
the future spread to get the estimated number of users prevented from being exposed to the fake
news that was debunked. y⋆ is the label of the article, estimated using Bayesian inference from
(θu,f ,θu, f¯ ), which are parameters used to model the flagging accuracy of a user, and are estimated
based on the history D of fact-checked news by sampling from the posterior distributions P(θu,f |D)
and P(θu, f¯ |D).
Limitation. Crowd-sourcing methods that essentially utilize reporting mechanisms, trade-off the
number of users affected (exposed to fake news) with the number of reports (flags) needed to make
a reliable prediction.
6.2.3 User behavior modeling. Apart from solutions based on explicit or implicit network mon-
itoring, another proposed solution is based on a model of user behavior and news sharing [79].
The proposed model is developed to determine how to prioritize fact-checking of news articles
by determining the optimal time of inspection of an article based on the proposed model of news
sharing. The sharing of news is modeled as a sequential process among rational agents, wherein
each agent chooses whether to verify the article, and chooses whether to share it with the next
agent or not. By rational agents it is assumed that agents intend to share only true news. Under
this model, the intervention can be designed as an optimal stopping problem solved using dynamic
programming to find the optimal time of inspection. The model characterizes agent judgments
in verifying fake news as well as the sequential interaction between agents, which are useful in
determining the optimal time and priority of inspection. For instance, if the article is likely to
be true or if is believed to be fake but more likely to be verified by the agents themselves before
sharing, the need for inspection is lowered.
Limitation. A drawback of the proposed method is that it is restricted to “tree” structured net-
works and cannot generalize to complex network topologies.
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Limitations of existing intervention based methods. Intervention based methods are more
difficult to evaluate and test out, especially in complex environments like this, with lots of interde-
pendent interactions. Also, they might make restrictive assumptions in certain cases which could
limit their applicability.
7 EXISTING DATASETS
The development of novel solutions to fake news detection has often been limited by data quality. In
order to facilitate future research on this topic, we have compiled a comprehensive list of datasets
related to the fake news detection task. Due to different research purposes, the data collections
could vary significantly. For example, some datasets focus solely on political statements while
others consist of open-domain news/articles. In addition, datasets could vary depending on what
labels are provided, how are the labels collected, what types of text contents are included (e.g.,
source claims, user responses, etc.), whether temporal and propagation information is recorded,
and the size of the collection. Therefore, we summarize these properties of the existing datasets.
7.1 Datasets enumeration
The following is a comprehensive list of existing datasets. For named datasets, we use existing
names as is; for unnamed ones, we assign suitable names for referencing.
7.1.1 LIAR. “Liar, Liar Pants on Fire": A New Benchmark Dataset for Fake News Detection.
[118] https://www.cs.ucsb.edu/ÌČwilliam/data/liar_dataset.zip
7.1.2 Twitter. Detecting Rumors from Microblogs with Recurrent Neural Networks. [61] http:
//alt.qcri.org/~wgao/data/rumdect.zip
7.1.3 Weibo. Detecting Rumors from Microblogs with Recurrent Neural Networks. [61] http:
//alt.qcri.org/~wgao/data/rumdect.zip
7.1.4 FacebookHoax. Some Like it Hoax: Automated Fake News Detection in Social Networks.
[109] https://github.com/gabll/some-like-it-hoax/tree/master/dataset
7.1.5 PHEME-R. Analyzing How People Orient to and Spread Rumours in Social Media by Looking
at Conversational Threads. [133] https://figshare.com/articles/PHEME_rumour_scheme_dataset_
journalism_use_case/2068650
7.1.6 PHEME. All-in-one: Multi-task Learning for Rumour Verification. [52] https://figshare.com/
articles/PHEME_dataset_for_Rumour_Detection_and_Veracity_Classification/6392078
7.1.7 Cred-1. Where the Truth Lies: Explaining the Credibility of Emerging Claims on theWeb and
Social Media. [85] http://www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/departments/databases-and-information\-systems/
research/impact/web-credibility-analysis/
7.1.8 Cred-2. Where the Truth Lies: Explaining the Credibility of Emerging Claims on theWeb and
Social Media. [85] http://www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/departments/databases-and-information\-systems/
research/impact/web-credibility-analysis/
7.1.9 FakevsSatire. Fake News vs Satire: A Dataset and Analysis [35] https://github.com/jgolbeck/
fakenews
7.1.10 BuzzfeedNews. Hyperpartisan Facebook Pages Are Publishing False And Misleading Infor-
mationAtAnAlarming Rate. [103] https://github.com/BuzzFeedNews/2016-10-fac\ebook-fact-check
7.1.11 KaggleFN. Kaggle fake news dataset. https://www.kaggle.com/mrisdal/fake-news
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7.1.12 NewsFN. GeorgeMcIntire/fake_real_news_dataset https://github.com/GeorgeMcIntire/fake_
real_news_dataset
7.1.13 BuzzfeedPolitical. This Just In: Fake News Packs a Lot in Title, Uses Simpler, Repetitive Con-
tent in Text Body, More Similar to Satire than Real News. [43] https://github.com/BenjaminDHorne/
fakenewsdata1
7.1.14 Political-1. This Just In: Fake News Packs a Lot in Title, Uses Simpler, Repetitive Content
in Text Body, More Similar to Satire than Real News. [43] https://github.com/BenjaminDHorne/
fakenewsdata1
7.1.15 KaggleEmergent. Kaggle rumors dataset. https://www.kaggle.com/arminehn/rumor-citation
7.1.16 NewsFN-2014. Fact Checking: Task definition and dataset construction. [115] https://sites.
google.com/site/andreasvlachos/resources/FactChecking_LTCSS2014_release.tsv?attredirects=0
7.1.17 NewsTrustData. Leveraging Joint Interactions for Credibility Analysis in News Communi-
ties. [71] https://www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/departments/databases-and-\information-systems/research/
impact/credibilityanalysis/
7.1.18 FakeNewsNet-1. FakeNewsNet: A Data Repository with News Content, Social Context and
Dynamic Information for Studying Fake News on Social Media [100] https://github.com/KaiDMML/
FakeNewsNet
7.1.19 FakeNewsNet-2. FakeNewsNet: A Data Repository with News Content, Social Context and
Dynamic Information for Studying Fake News on Social Media. [100] https://github.com/KaiDMML/
FakeNewsNet
7.1.20 Twitter15. Detect Rumors in Microblog Posts Using Propagation Structure via Kernel Learn-
ing. [63] https://www.dropbox.com/s/7ewzdrbelpmrnxu/rumdetect2017.zip?dl=0
7.1.21 Twitter16. Detect Rumors in Microblog Posts Using Propagation Structure via Kernel Learn-
ing. [63] https://www.dropbox.com/s/7ewzdrbelpmrnxu/rumdetect2017.zip?dl=0
7.1.22 FEVER. FEVER: A Large-scale Dataset for Fact Extraction and VERification. [111] http:
//fever.ai/data.html
7.1.23 FNC-1. Fake News Challenge: Stance Detection Dataset. https://github.com/FakeNews\
Challenge/fnc-1
7.2 Dataset Characteristics
We provide a summarization of the characteristic features of listed datasets in Tables 2, 3, and 4
based on the task and application context, information content features and collected user responses
features.
7.2.1 Task and application context. In Table 2, we mention the task/application context for each
dataset along with the task labels provided in the dataset. We additionally mention the content
types (domains) such as political news, entertainment news, Wikipedia statements, etc. that are
encompassed by contents of each dataset. Lastly, we provide the annotation scheme used in the
dataset which provides crucial insight into the data quality. For instance, KaggleFN dataset consists
of news articles that aremarked as fake by the BS-Detector application and not through journalistic
or human verification, which means that the dataset labels could be noisy and moreover, training a
model to learn those labels, is essentially training a model to essentially mimic BS-Detector [100].
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Table 2. Datasets Characteristics. Task/Application and Annotation.
Dataset Task/Application Task labels Content
type
Annotator
LIAR fake news detection pants-fire, false,
barely-true, half-true,
mostly-true, and true
1
political state-
ments
PolitiFact
FakevsSatire fake news detection fake, satire 1 political news researchers
NewsFN fake news detection fake, real news articles unspecified
BuzzfeedPolitical fake news detection fake, real political news verified list
Political-1 fake news detection fake, real, satire political news Zimdars websites list
NewsFN-2014 fake news detection true, mostly true,
half true, mostly
false, false 1
fact-checked
claims
Channel4 and Politi-
Fact
NewsTrustData credibility assess-
ment
qualitative scores 11 news articles NewsTrust member
Twitter rumor classification rumor, non-rumor fact-checked
claims
mapped from Snopes
5
Weibo rumor classification rumor, non-rumor fact-checked
claims
Sina community
management center
Twitter15 rumor classification rumor (false, true,
remains unverified),
non-rumor
fact-checked
claims
mapped from Snopes
5
Twitter16 rumor classification rumor (false, true,
remains unverified),
non-rumor
fact-checked
claims
mapped from Snopes
5
PolitiFact fake news detection fake, real political state-
ments
PolitiFact
GossipCop fake news detection fake, real entertainment
news
GossipCop
FacebookHoax hoax detection hoax, non-hoax sicentific, con-
spiracy
non-hoax as scien-
tific
PHEME-R 12 rumor analysis rumor only (false,
true, remains unveri-
fied) 2
newsworthy
stories
journalists6, crowd-
sourcing7
PHEME rumor classification rumor (false, true,
remains unverified),
non-rumor
newsworthy
stories
journalists6, crowd-
sourcing7
BuzzfeedNews fake news detection mostly true, mixture,
mostly false, no fac-
tual content
political news unspecfied
KaggleEmergent rumor classification rumor (false, true, un-
verified)
fact-checked
claims
Emergent
KaggleFN fake news detection only fake news articles BS Detector 8
Cred-1 fact extraction false, true fact-checked
claims
mapped from Snopes
9
Cred-2 fact extraction only false wikipedia
hoax
verified list 9
FEVER fact extraction supported, refuted,
not enough info 4
constructed
claims 3
trained annotators
FNC-1 stance detection agrees, disagrees, dis-
cusses, unrelated
news articles FakeNewsChallenge
10
1 with justifications 2 plus posts stance, certainty, evidentiality 3 using Wikipedia 4 with evidence 5
mapping policy not specified 6 for class label 7 other annotations 8 not fact-checked by humans 9
also provides Search Engine results for claims (but without annotating stance) 10 stance of the body
towards the title 11 (objectivity, correctness, bias, credibility) 12 used in RumorEval Task
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Table 3. Dataset Characteristics. Information content to be classified (claims, articles, etc.).
Dataset Total
claims
Collection
period
Number of claims (split by label)
LIAR 12.8K 2007-2016 roughly equal
FakevsSatire 486 2016-2017 58% fake
NewsFN 6331 roughly equal
BuzzfeedPolitical 120 Jan-Oct 2016 roughly equal
Political-1 225 roughly equal
NewsFN-2014 221 2013-2014 68% half true, 50% false, rest ∼35%
NewsTrustData 82K per article not applicable to qualitative scores
Twitter 992 Mar-Dec 2015 roughly equal
Weibo 4664 roughly equal
Twitter15 1,490 roughly equal
Twitter16 818 roughly equal
PolitiFact 488 dynamic roughly equal
GossipCop 3570 dynamic 19% fake
FacebookHoax 15.5K 60% hoax
PHEME-R 330 50% true, 20% false, 30% unverified
PHEME 6425 60% non-rumor, rumor: 16% true, 10% false,
10% unverified
BuzzfeedNews 2282 19-27 Sep 2016 38% mostly false / mixture
KaggleEmergent 2145 Jan-Dec 2017 26% false, 34% true, 40% unverified
KaggleFN 13K Oct-Nov 2016 all fake
Cred-1 4856 74% false
Cred-2 157 all false
FEVER 185K 55% support, 20% refute, 25% other
FNC-1 50K 7% agree, 2% disagree, 18% discuss 5
Table 4. Dataset Characteristics. Collected responses (user engagements) on social media. [y=yes, blank=no].
Dataset Avg / claim Time-
stamp
Text User
info
Tree Network Platform
Twitter 1111 y y y Twitter
Weibo 816 y y y Weibo
Twitter15 223 y y y y Twitter
Twitter16 251 y y y y Twitter
PolitiFact 357 y y y y Twitter
GossipCop 10 y y y y Twitter
FacebookHoax 156 1 y y y Facebook
PHEME-R 15 y y y y y Twitter
PHEME 16 y y y y Twitter
BuzzfeedNews 9792 2 Facebook
KaggleEmergent 7187 3 not specified
KaggleFN 27 2 Facebook
1 only likes 2 only counts (shares, reactions, comments) 3 only counts (shares)
7.2.2 Information content. In Table 3 we provide additional details about the information content
that are made available in each dataset. The information content (claim) to be verified can be an
article, post, political statement, news stories, etc. as mentioned under Content Types in Table
2. Here, we mention the total number of claims in each dataset. Total claims is the number of
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information contents that need to be verified. In addition we provide the division of claims by task
labels such as the percentage of fake vs true articles in the dataset, which are useful for accessing
applicability of machine learning models to a specific dataset. Lastly, we provide the collection
period, that is the period in which the collected articles/claims were published or posted, which
much like the domain (content types) is an important characteristic of the dataset. When the
collection period is left blank, it means that it is unspecified in the dataset.
7.2.3 User responses. Lastly, in Table 4 we provide features of user responses collected from user
engagements with the information content, on social media. Note that this information is only
provided in a subset of the datasets. We mention different features of the user responses in the
Table such as average responses per claim, which is a popularly mentioned statistic in existing
datasets. However, there can be high variation in the number of responses, based on virality of
collected stories, and the platform used for collection such as Twitter, Weibo. The platform is also
mentioned in the Table, for each dataset.9 In addition, we note whether timestamp information,
text information (in comments/replies), user information (user participating in the response),
propagation tree information (who replies to whom) and social network information of users
(follower-followee relationships) is provided in each dataset. Together, the three tables provide
comprehensive insights into all existing datasets, facilitating a comparative analysis between them,
in order to identify the potential shortcomings of existing datasets, as well as to identify the best
choice of a dataset for a particular application/task, or to determine its suitability for training a
specific detection model.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
The literature surveyed here has demonstrated significant advances in addressing the identification
and mitigation of fake news. Nevertheless, there remain many challenges to overcome in practice.
We now outline three concrete directions for future research that can further advance the landscape
of computational solutions.
(1) Dynamic knowledge bases. Although we can design many features which can potentially
help us determine the truthfulness of a news article, the truthfulness is still ultimately defined
by the statements it makes. The greatest challenge in developing automated fact-checking
methods is the construction of dynamic knowledge bases, which can be regularly and auto-
matically updated to reflect the changes occurring in a fast-paced world.
(2) New intervention strategies. For the design of useful intervention strategies for different
environments, the most important question that needs to be answered is which environ-
mental factors are most conducive to the spread of fake news. Studying and characterizing
the relationship between user actions and utilities at the microscopic level of the individ-
ual, and the macroscopic impact in different networked environments, will be essential for
explaining the spread of fake news and finding the best intervention strategies suited to
that environment. Another interesting direction is towards educational interventions. Re-
cently, Gillani et al. 2018 studied the effect of educating people about the polarization of
their social ego-networks using visualization tools that show users their social connections
along with the inferred political orientations of other users in their network, to determine
9In accordance with the platform Twitter’s information sharing policy, public release and distribution of tweet contents and
metadata is restricted. Twitter based datasets generally release tweet ids and user ids from which complete information
about contents and metadata is obtainable through Twitter Search API. For these datasets, for information that is obtainable
from Twitter, we mark the information as available in our Tables regardless of whether it is released in the dataset directly
or through the Twitter id information.
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its impact on the user’s connection diversity after the treatment. Another study proposed
an active inoculation strategy using a “fake news game", where participants were asked to
create content by using misleading tactics from the perspective of fake news creators [94].
The authors found preliminary evidence of its effectiveness in reducing perceived reliability
and persuasiveness of fake news articles in a randomized field study of 95 high school students.
(3) Datasets for intent detection. Current datasets generally provide binary labels of infor-
mation as fake or true. However, a more fine-grained classification of information by intent
might be especially beneficial in identifying truly fake news from closely related information
such as satire and opinion news. In the list of fake websites maintained by [131], there is a
type label allowing up to 3 types for each website with tags such as political, satire, or biased.
Some recent works have considered classification of fake vs satire news [35] and fake vs
hyperpartisan news [87] and we believe that this is an important direction for the future.
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A APPENDIX
We consolidate quantitative results on fake news (rumor) detection in terms of classification
accuracy for several of the methods discussed earlier on a representative sample of the datasets
namely Twitter collected by [89], Weibo and Twitter collected by [61], Twitter15 and Twitter16
collected by [63]; based on experimental evaluation performed in several works [61, 65, 89, 96].
While the list of methods and datasets is not exhaustive, there are other methods such as Ma et al.
2018a, Kochkina et al. 2018a and other datasets such as PHEME, PolitiFact, GossipCop [51, 100]
that could be evaluated, we regard a more extensive bench-marking based on specific application
contexts with datasets of varying content types and collection periods as a direction for future
work. Table 5, 6 contain the consolidated quantitative results of classification accuracy for detection
under content-based and feedback-based methods.
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Table 5. Content-based (w/o user responses at test time) methods. Classification accuracy (%). Results
consolidated from [89].
Methods Weibo [61] Twitter [89]
Ott et al. 2011 - LIWC 66.06 62.13
Ott et al. 2011 - POS 74.77 70.34
Ott et al. 2011 - n-gram 84.76 80.69
Wang 2017 86.23 83.24
Qian et al. 2018 89.84 88.83
Table 6. Feedback-based methods. Feature engineering, temporal, propagation. Classification accuracy (%).
Results consolidated from [65, 96].
Methods Weibo Twitter Twitter15 Twitter16
[61] [61] [63] [63]
Zhao et al. 2015 73.2 64.4 40.9 41.4
Castillo et al. 2011 83.1 73.1 45.4 46.5
Kwon et al. 2017 84.9 77.2 56.5 58.5
Ma et al. 2015 85.7 80.8 54.4 57.4
Ma et al. 2016 91.1 88.1 64.1 63.3
Ruchansky et al. 2017 95.3 89.2 - -
Wu et al. 2015 x x 49.3 51.1
Ma et al. 2017 x x 66.7 66.2
Ma et al. 2018b x x 72.3 73.7
x = Cannot be evaluated as per dataset features (information unavailable for method)
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